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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0672
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1140
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1342
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3431
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4182
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002500

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE), IO, IO/UNP (WICKBERG), DRL/AWH (BUCKLEY), S/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC ID BM

SUBJECT: PRESSING FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON BURMA IN UNSC

REF: STATE 123219

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Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

- 11. (C) Summary: DCM emphasized reftel points on Burma with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) Secretary General, September 7. Pol/C also underlined points at DEPLU office director level. GOI is committed not to praise in any way the regime's so-called "National Convention," but did not explicitly commit to support informal consultations at the UNSC, nor a near-term visit to Burma by Envoy Gambari.
- 12. (C) Summary (Con'd): Pol/C also pressed members of the legislative branch (DPR) and think-tank analysts in order to stimulate further pressure on the government. We think that continued engagement with the GOI and other sectors can bring the situation closer to the top of the GOI's agenda, though the government's clear proclivity is not to put its head above the parapet. End Summary.

Making Points with DEPLU

- 13. (C) In his meeting with Secretary General Imron Cotan, DEPLU's second-highest ranking official, the DCM expressed the USG's deep concern about the crackdown, noting the arrests and beatings that have taken place. The timing of the crackdown demonstrates the regime's opposition to any genuine dialogue. The U.S. urges that Indonesia not make any statement of support for the so-called National Convention. The GOI should also support efforts for a near-term briefing re Burma at the UNSC plus a visit to Burma by UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari as long as he can meet with Aung San Suu Kyi and other activists.
- 14. (C) Cotan replied that the GOI would not make any statement in support of the convention. He listened to the points regarding informal consultations at the UN and the possible Gambari visit, but did not commit to anything specific. Cotan asserted that the GOI and other ASEAN members have raised the Burmese regime's behavior in ASEAN meetings (apparently before the latest crackdown), but not received any reaction from the Burmese representatives present.
- 15. (C) Pol/C also emphasized reftel points in his September

10 meeting with Hari Purwanto, DEPLU Director for North American Affairs. A representative of DEPLU's ASEAN office was also present. Pol/C noted that Indonesia, as the region's largest country and a democracy, could play a key role in pressing the Burmese regime to relent. It was not enough that the USG or the UK made statements: it was important that Burma's neighbors take robust diplomatic action. Indonesia, as a UNSC member at this time and with its UNSC presidency coming up in November, could help lead this effort.

16. (C) Purwanto thanked Pol/C for the points, adding that they would be reviewed very carefully. The GOI, he said, "cared about the situation in Myanmar," but was still examining any next steps. It would be a mistake for the international community to take action if it turned out to be counter-productive. Pol/C assured Purwanto that the USG points were well-thought out and represented a constructive way for the international community to react to the regime's provocations, which were extremely grave.

Using other Angles

- 17. (C) In a bid to influence other sectors of Indonesian society, Pol/C also reached out to Djoko Susilo, an M.P. who is a member of the DPR's Commission on Foreign Affairs. Pol/C noted that it would be very helpful if members of the legislature start publicly discussing the Burmese situation, pressing for GOI action on the matter. Susilo, the Chair of the DPR's Caucus on Myanmar, responded that he and his colleagues were drawing up a petition expressing "deep concern" about the regime's actions that would be submitted to President Yudhoyono. Pol/C urged that the petition move forward soon.
- $\underline{\$}8.$ (C) Pol/C also spoke with Rizal Mallarangeng, the JAKARTA 00002500 002.2 OF 002

Executive Director of the Freedom Institute, a local public policy NGO. Pol/C noted that it would be constructive if local think-tanks took more of an activist approach by writing op-eds on the situation and holding meetings about Southeast Asian responses to the crisis. Mallarangeng took the points on board, remarking that he would raise the matter with his brother, Andi, one of President Yudhoyono's spokesmen.

Further Engagement Key

¶9. (C) The Indonesian government's clear proclivity--perhaps because it is waiting for further consultations with its ASEAN partners--is not to put its head above the parapet on this matter. Moreover, so far, the crackdown does not seem to have triggered broad interest among the chattering classes or the public. That said, we think that continued engagement with the GOI and other sectors can bring the situation closer to the top of the agenda. The GOI values the exposure it is getting as a UNSC member and--as a new democracy that is shaking off an autocratic past--basically wants to be seen as doing the right thing re Burma. HUME